



Emerging and future urban threats—implications for ops

NATO S&T Organization: SAS-149
Basics of complex modern urban functions and characteristics

David J. Kilcullen

Professor of International & Political Studies, University of New South Wales, Canberra

2

Agenda

- Context
- Emerging technologies and urban conflict
- Emerging urban tactics
- Weaponizing the city

1. Context

The environment for adversaries


- Western air superiority, but limited weight of allied air power and less capable local ground forces
- Pervasive electronic surveillance but high traffic volumes
- High degree of connectivity (cellphones, internet, social media, gaming networks) enabling propaganda and C2
- Pervasive smart handheld consumer electronics and support platforms
- Technological hugging of our systems (Google Earth, GPS)
- High degree of technical and mechanical skill among urban populations



6

2. Emerging and disruptive technology

The connectivity explosion







Disruptive technology

If a commercial product goes through a generation every two years, and the military cycle takes six years per generation, then in twelve years the military product goes from being four times as powerful as the competition to a quarter as powerful...

Technologies developed for phones fit well with the requirements for small drones. Like phones, drones need miniature cameras, GPS navigation, and data processing power. Both share the same need for minimal size, weight, and power. A drone is simply a smartphone with wings, and the wings are the cheap part.














PLASTIKOV V2.0 3D-PRINTABLE AKM RECEIVER



The Plastikov v2.0 is a 3D-printable AKM receiver.

This project represents the first known printable AKM-pattern receiver. Tested over 10 versions, 3000 rounds of ammo, over the course of four months.

The updated version (v2.0) is compatible with AR15-based stocks, generic rear trunnions, and a wider variety of AKM parts kits as a result.







Armored SVBIED=precision guided missile


West of Erbil, Iraq
ISIS 8-ton ANFO SVBIED



3. Emerging urban tactics









Operational Parameters

- Leaderless resistance, no "brain" or HQ—remote or stand-off controller or one-way broadcast of operational guidance
- Basic element: the autonomous, self-organising combat group (20-40 pax, 3-5 vehicles, heavy/light weapons mix, specialist kill teams, fluid formations and organisations, vertical [drone] manoeuvre
- Infestation of complex environment (embedded in physical structures and populations)
- large numbers of small multi-role platforms operating in a dynamic swarm.
- modular organisations to lowest possible level (combat pairs)
- cooperative and remote engagement, through repurposing consumer electronics and industrial capacity
- cyber-kinetic ops, reflexive control and manipulation of perceptions
- Improvizable capabilities (e.g. 3D printing), technological "hugging" and high latent technological capacity in the population,
- diaspora linkages and retaliation options, manipulation of social movements and public protests (incl. general strike);
- no-go areas, control by interdiction, commuter insurgency, tactical use of terror to shape force deployment options
- actions across the full breadth and depth of an urban-peri-urban-rural nodal matrix


Emerging enemy approaches

- Actions across the full breadth and depth of an urban/peri-urban/rural nodal matrix (urban centre, "belts", exurbs, satellite cities)
- Leaderless resistance, no "brain" or HQ—acephalous swarms, remote or stand-off control nodes, or one-way broadcast of operational guidance
- 3. "Infestation" of urban environment (embedded in physical structures, hollow and interior spaces, and populations)
- 4. Large numbers of small multi-role platforms operating in a dynamic swarm
- Modular organisations to lowest possible level (combat pairs)
- Cooperative and remote engagement, through repurposing consumer electronics and industrial capacity
- 7. Cyber-kinetic ops—cyber as an adjunct integrated manoeuvre space
- 8. Improvisable capabilities (eg 3D printing), technological "hugging" and high latent technological capacity in the population
- Diaspora linkages and retaliation options, manipulation of social movements and public protests (incl. general strike)
- 10. No-go and no-see areas, control by interdiction, commuter insurgency, tactical use of terror to shape adversary deployment

Tactics in the urban defence

- Less focused on area defence of urban areas, more on actively defending surrounding rural zones (belts)
- Urban center may be economy of force, with main effort withheld and stronger counterattack and QRF operating in belts
- Little tendency to fight "last stand" defensive actions: area denial and active (flexible) defence, mobile mesh or network defence
- Likely to fade away in face of strong attack, then engage in rapid counterattacks using stay-behind groups or multi-planar reinfiltration
- Active patrolling—fighting patrols, recce patrols, raids, use of many small actions as cover/to desensitize and shape defenders ahead of major strikes
- River-borne and seaborne attacks, typically by night and in bad weather

Urban networked defence






Tactics in the urban attack

- Reflexive control/mildec: place the enemy in a cognitive box
- Use of terrorism to manipulate (fix) defender laydown
- Multiple small modular fighting groups
- Urban, peri-urban and rural networked cells to support a pseudo-conventional main force (underground, auxiliary and guerrilla [partisan] force)
- Urban siege ("raid and hold")
- Baited ambushes on relief force routes
- Sabotage of sea/air points of entry
- House bombs, VBIEDs, drone IEDs, "artificial bird strike"



Months of logistic and "guerrilla diplomacy" preparation. Infil of small urban guerrilla cells (5-15-man teams) to exurbs/outskirts from D-30. Exploitation of Eid festival. Three converging columns simultaneously atk from multiple axes, guerrillas attack key objs from rear. Focus on driving police and ANA to airport, then ambushing relief column.





Urban insurgency

- Multi-path re-infiltration of previously cleared areas
- Mobile IEDs repositioned by drone
- Commuter insurgency, urban areas denied not defended
- Anti-aircraft ambushes
- Runway and harbour denial operations
- Snipers, mortars in depth (keyhole shots, observers forward or remotely located using Google Earth/GPS/GLONASS)
- Anti-tank kill teams working in on armour from flanks
- Tunneling and placement of IEDs under buildings
- The tunnel as a network (cf. ATN approach to IEDs)
- Mounted counterattack in technicals against HQ
- House bombs, SVBIEDs, IEDs in thick defensive clusters







Urban terrorism

- Sabotage using SCADA systems and "smart city" internet-of-things infrastructure
- Subversion/co-option of security forces & police
- Soft targets, mix of low-tech and high-tech attacks
- Terrorist attacks on infrastructure and population clusters
- Social movement manipulation (riots, flash mobs, strikes)
- Collaboration and competition with crime groups
- CBRN terrorism--industrial incident, drone-based spray of nerve agent, mass panic/population move
- Deception-based ambushes using cyber-manipulation
- Ability to go kinetic in small groups (assault pairs) at short notice for complex attacks





Future networked hybrid guerrilla?




networks


teams

4. Weaponizing the city

The City as a System



A "professional" urban networked littoral raid









Nice, 14 July 2016



Low-tech attack exploiting spatial layout and predicted crowd flow dynamics

Las Vegas, 1 October 2017



Non-ideological (?) single-shooter attack exploiting spatial layout and crowd flows

